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TANULMÁNYOK 
 
 
Beryl terHaar 
Effect of European fundamental (social) rights on the national 
legal order. A simple roadmap 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the practice of the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) 
regarding the application of EU Fundamental rights in the horizontal situation, thus 
between two private parties. Although Article 51 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union limits the application of the Charter to the institutions of the 
EU and the Member States when implementing EU Law, the CJEUhas developed a 
mechanism by which individuals can also rely on these fundamental rights.A successful 
claim results in the exclusion of the conflicting national legislation. Given this significant 
impact, it is essential to understand what the requirements are that need to be fulfilled 
for the fundamental (social) right to have this effect. However, the case law of the CJEU 
on this issue is complex and is becoming extensive. By applying a systematic analysis of 
some land mark cases, especially Mangold and Kücükdeveci, this paper reveals that the 
CJEU seems to follow a rather simple scheme.  
 
1. Introduction: EU Fundamental (social) Rights and the National Legal 
Order 
 
In 2000 the EU adopted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (further: the Charter). At that time, it was considered to be merely a codification 
of fundamental rights in order to make them more visible.1 The rights enshrined in the 
Charter are drawn from various international sources, among which human rights 
instruments of the United Nations and the Council of Europe, as well as national 
sources, including constitutional traditions of the EU Member States.2 With the Treaty 
of Lisbon entering into force per 1 December 2009, the Charter gained the same legal 
value as the Treaties.3 The Charter has been hailed as progressive in the sense that it 
doesn’t follow a traditional distinction in first, second, and third generation fundamental 
rights,4 instead its approach is based on the ‘indivisible universal values of human 
                                                            
1 T. Hervey and J. Kenner (eds. 2003), Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
A Legal Perspective. Oxford: Hart Publishing, p. vii. 
2 Cf. Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
3 As is declared in Article 6(1) Treaty on European Union 
4 First generation fundamental rights refer to civil and political rights, whereas second and third generation 
fundamental rights refer to social, economic and development rights. See more elaborate: Ph. Alston (1982), 
‘A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International 
Human Rights Law?’, Vol. 29(3) Netherlands International Law Review, p. 307-322; and J. Krommendijk (2015), 
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dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity’.5 Another characteristic of the Charter is that 
its application is explicitly stipulated in Article 51 of the Charter, limiting it to the 
conduct of the institutions of the EU and the Member States ‘only when they are 
implementing Union law’.6 
All together the Charter has left the legal doctrine with many questions about 
the meaning of the Charter in practice.7 Not in the least concerning the way the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has given effect to this in relation to the 
application of directives in the horizontal situation between two private parties.8 A 
remarkable move, since the standing approach of the CJEU has been that a directive, 
by its definition has no horizontal direct effect.9 More particularly, in landmark case 
Kücükdeveci10 the CJEU concluded that the national legislation which was in conflict 
with a directive provision implementing an EU fundamental right, was to be excluded 
from application. This raised much commotion in the legal doctrine.11 More cases 
followed invoking fundamental rights, including other grounds of equal treatment (e.g. 
between man and woman, sexual orientation), the right to be consulted and informed, 
the right to paid annual leave, and the right to an effective remedy and a fair trial. In 
some cases, the CJEU concluded that the fundamental right invoked was having 
exclusionary effect, for instance equal treatment on grounds of age12 and of gender13 
and the right to effective remedy and a fair trial14. In other cases, the CJEU concluded 
                                                            
‘Principled Silence or Mere Silence on Principles? The Role of the EU Charter’s Principles in the Case Law 
of the Court of Justice’, Vol. 11 European Constitutional Law Review, p. 321-356. 
5Cf. Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
6 E. Hancox (2013), ‘The meaning of “implementing” EU law under Article 51(1) of the Charter: Åkerberg 
Fransson’, Vol.50 Common Market Law Review, p. 1411-1432. 
7E.g. L. Betten (2001), ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: a Trojan Horse or a Mouse?’, 17 International 
Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations; M.P. Maduro (2003), ‘The Double Constitutional 
Life of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’, in T. Hervey and J. Kenner (eds. 2003), 
Economic and Social Rights under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. A Legal Perspective. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, p. 269 – 299; and S. Smismans (2009), ‘The European Union’s Fundamental Rights Myth’, Vol. 
8(1) Journal of Common Market Studies, p. 45-66. 
8 E.g. S. I. Sanchez (2012), ‘The Court and the Charter: The impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon 
treaty on the CJEU’s approach to fundamental rights’, Vol. 49 Common Market Law Review, p. 1565-1612; 
and S. Robin-Olivier (2014), ‘The evolution of direct effect in the EU: Stocktaking, problems, projections’, 
Vol 12(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law, p. 165-188. 
9 CJEU 26 February 1986, C152/84 (Marshall), ECLI:EU:C:1986:84. 
10CJEU 19 January 2010, C-555/07 (Kücükdeveci / Swedex), ECLI:EU:C:2010:21 
11Among many others: M. Mol (2010), ‘Kücükdeveci: Mangold revisited – Horizontal Direct Effect of a 
General Principle of EU Law: Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) Judgement of 19 
January 2010, Case C-555/07, SedaKücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, European Constitution Law Review, 
Volume 6, Issue 2, pp. 293-308; T. Roes (2009), ‘Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GMBH & 
CO.KG’, 16 Columbian Journal of European Law, 497-518; and F. Fontanelli (2010), ‘Some Reflections on the 
Choices of the European Court of Justice in the Kücükdeveci Preliminary Ruling’, Perspective on Federalism, 
Vol. 2, No.2, pp. 15-23. 
12CJEU 19 January 2010, C-555/07 (Kücükdeveci / Swedex), ECLI:EU:C:2010:21.  
13CJEU 30 September 2010, C-104/09 (RocaAlvarez) ECLI:EU:C:2010:561. 
14CJEU 12 February 2015, C-396/13 (Sahkoalojenammattiliittory / EiektrobudowaSpółkaAkcyjna), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:86.  
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that the fundamental right invoked did not have this effect, for example the right to 
information and consultation15 and the right to paid annual leave16.  
In some literature, this practice of the CJEU, i.e. giving exclusionary effect to a 
directive through a fundamental right, has been indicated as a third corrective on the 
lack of horizontal direct effect of directives.17 Hence the terms ‘Kücükdeveci-corrective’ 
or ‘Swedex-mechanism’.18 The other two ‘correctives’ are ‘EU law conform 
interpretation’ and ‘state liability action’, doctrines that have been developed by the 
CJEU in the cases Marleasing19 and Francovich20 respectively. 
When discussing the Kücükdeveci-corrective, many scholars focus on the 
substantive considerations of the CJEU,21 only a few aim to fathom the Court’s 
approach from a more procedural or formal perspective.22 Although the former is 
necessary to get a better understanding of the content and scope of these rights, deeper 
insight about the more procedural or formal requirements concerning the application 
of these rights contributes to more legal certainty and clarity when relying on these 
rights in court. The focus of this study, therefore, lies with the formal requirements the 
CJEU has developed in its case-law in order to determine whether a directive involving 
a fundamental right can have exclusionary effect on national legislation. The study is 
structured as follows. First the effect of the Kücükdeveci-corrective is discussed more 
elaborately, including a discussion on one of the main commentaries, namely that it 
might conflict with the principle of legal certainty. Second the various criteria employed 
by the CJEU are unpacked. Rather than focussing on one main case, e.g. Kücükdeveci, 
the analysis is based on various cases of the CJEU. Based on the combined analysis of 
these cases the study concludes with a summary of the criteria that need to be fulfilled 
for a directive dealing with a fundamental right to have exclusionary effect.  
 
2. The effect of the Kücükdeveci-corrective 
 
The basic idea that lies at the foundation of the Kücükdeveci-corrective is that, 
since the claim involves a fundamental (social) right, it adds legal weight to the directive 
that deals with this right. Consequently, the interpretation of national legislation is not 
only in light of the directive, but fore mostly with the fundamental right, which national 
legislation ought to be in compliance with. If not, it is the fundamental right, dealt with 
                                                            
15CJEU 15 January 2014, C-176/12 (Association de MédiationSociale (AMS)), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2.  
16CJEU 24 January 2012, C-282/10 (Dominguez) ECLI:EU:C:2012:33.  
17A.Ph.C.M. Jaspers en S.M.M. Peters (2016), ‘Sociale Grondrechten’, in Pennings and Peters (eds.), Inleiding 
Europees Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer (4th edition), p 70. 
18 These terms are derived from the names of the parties in the like-named case: CJEU 19 januari 2010, C-
555/07 (Kücükdeveci/Swedex), EU:C:2010:21 
19Marshall, 152/84, EU:C:1986:84, par. 48 
20CJEU 19 November 1991, C-6/90 and 9/90 (Francovich e.o.), EU:C:1991:428 
21 E.g. C. Leone (2010), ‘Towards a more shared parenthood? The case of Roca Alvarez in context’, Vol.1(4) 
European Labour Law Journal, p. 513 – 516; E. Howard (2011), ‘CJEU advances equality in Europe by giving 
horizontal direct effect to directives. Vol. 17(4), European Public Law, p. 729 – 743; and L. Pech (2012), 
‘Between Judicial minimalisation and avoidance: the Court of Justice’s sidestepping of fundamental 
constitutional issues in Römer and Dominguez’, Vol. 49(6) Common Market Law Review, p. 1841-1880.  
22 E.g. D. Schieck (2010), ‘Constitutional principles and horizontal effect: Kücükdeveci revisited’, European 
Labour Law Journal 2010/3, p. 368-379. 
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in the directive, that excludes the application of the conflicting national legislation. This 
interpretation can be derived from the Court’s reasoning in the Mangold-case, in which 
the Court indicated that enforcement of compliance with a fundamental (social) right 
cannot merely depend on the applicability of the directive by which it is regulated.23 
When the Kücükdeveci-corrective is applied successfully, it results in the exclusion of 
the national legislation that conflicts with the directive and therefore the fundamental 
(social) right. In this situation, it is for the national court to ‘find the law’ and to issue a 
ruling that corresponds with the interpretation of the fundamental (social) right, and 
therefore the directive provision that deals with this right, as given by the CJEU. 
The Kücükdeveci-corrective has raised numerous comments,24 particularly 
with regard to the principle of legal certainty. Critics of the corrective argue that because 
of the exclusionary effect, private parties are confronted with an unexpected 
obligation.25 An issue that was explicitly raised in case Rasmussen.26 Rasmussen was 
dismissed on the age of 60 by his employer Ajos. In principle, he was entitled to a 
severance payment equal to three months’ salary. Additionally, from the age of 60 he 
was also entitled to an old-age pension payable by the employer. Standing national case-
law on the latter barred his entitlement to the severance payment, despite the fact that 
he remained active on the labour market after he left Ajos. The court in first instance 
(the Maritime and Commercial Court) found stated that it was clear from previous case 
law27 that the respective national rule was in conflict with Directive 2000/78 and 
inconsistent with the general principle, enshrined in EU law, prohibiting discrimination 
on grounds of age.28 Ajos appealed with the Danish Supreme Court which submitted 
preliminary questions to the CJEU. In one of the questions it asked whether the general 
EU principle prohibiting discrimination on grounds of age should be weight against ‘the 
principle of legal certainty and the related principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations’, and whether it should be concluded on that bases ‘that the principle of 
legal certainty must take precedence over the principle prohibiting discrimination on 
grounds of age’?29 In this context the CJEU recalled the Member States’ obligation to 
achieve the results envisaged by the directive and their duty to take all appropriate 
measures to ensure fulfilment of that obligation.30 This includes an obligation of 
                                                            
23CJEU 22 november 2005, C-144/04 (Mangold),ECLI:EU:C:2005:709, paras 74-76 
24 Among many others: M. Mol (2010), ‘Kücükdeveci: Mangold revisited – Horizontal Direct Effect of a 
General Principle of EU Law: Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) Judgement of 19 
January 2010, Case C-555/07, Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, European Constitution Law Review, 
Volume 6, Issue 2, pp. 293-308; T. Roes (2009), ‘Case C-555/07, SEDA KÜCÜKDEVECI V. SWEDEX 
GMBH & CO.KG’, 16 Columbian Journal of European Law, 497-518; and F. Fontanelli (2010), ‘Some Reflections 
on the Choices of the European Court of Justice in the Kücükdeveci Preliminary Ruling’, Perspective on 
Federalism, Vol. 2, No.2, pp. 15-23. 
25 A.Ph.C.M. Jaspers en S.M.M. Peters (2013), ‘Sociale Grondrechten’, in S.M.M. Peters en R.M. Beltzer 
(red.), Inleiding Europees Arbeidsrecht, Deventer: Kluwer, p. 79. They base their conclusion on the fact that 
the exact interpretation of the fundamental (social) right is to be derived from the provision of the directive. 
Similar: AG Trstenjak in the case C-282/10, Dominguez, ECLI:EU:C:2011:559, para 156.  
26 CJEU 19 April 2016, C-441/14 (Rasmussen), ECLI:EU:C:2016:278.  
27 Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark (C‑499/08, EU:C:2010:600). 
28 CJEU 19 April 2016, C-441/14 (Rasmussen), ECLI:EU:C:2016:278, par. 13. 
29 Idem, par. 20(2).  
30 Idem, par. 30. 
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national courts to interpret national legislation as much as possible in conformity with 
‘the wording and the purpose of the directive concerned in order to achieve the result 
sought by the directive’.31 Furthermore, the CJEU reconfirmed that such interpretation 
of national law is limited by general principles of law and therefore cannot go contra 
legem.32 Additionally, the CJEU noted that "the requirement to interpret national law in 
conformity with EU law entails the obligation for national courts to change its 
established case-law, where necessary, if it is based on an interpretation of national law 
that is incompatible with the objectives of a directive".33 However, when the national 
court considers it impossible to interpret the national legislation in compliance with EU 
law, it follows from the cases Kücükdeveci and AMS that the national court has to disapply 
the national provision.34 If the national court refuses to act accordingly, for instance 
because of reasons of legal certainty, it would in fact deprive an individual of the 
protection EU law offers.35 Moreover, the CJEU stressed that the interpretation the 
CJEU gives to EU law "clarifies and, where necessary, defines the meaning and scope 
of that law as it must be, or ought to have been, understood and applied from the time 
of its coming into force".36 With this reasoning the court indicated that its 
interpretations cannot conflict with the principles of legal uncertainty and the protection 
of legitimate expectations, and only in very exceptional occasions it may not apply to 
legal relationships which arose and were established before the judgement ruling on the 
request for interpretation.37 Such was the situation in the Defrenne-case and the Bosman-
case, but not in the Rasmussen-case.38  
The above comes down to the following justification of the effect of the 
Kücükdeveci-corrective in relation to the general principles on legal certainty and the 
protection of legitimate expectations. Member States are obliged to interpret their 
legislation in conformity with EU law. However, this finds its limit when such 
interpretation would go contra legem. In the Rasmussen-case the CJEU clarified that this 
doesn't apply to case-law, on the contrary, since the case-law is an interpretation of the 
law, it falls within the obligation of the Member State to adjust its case-law into an 
interpretation of the national legislation that is in compliance with EU law. However, 
when the EU law concerns a fundamental right, which fulfils certain criteria (which will 
be further worked out in the next sections of this study), the national legislation that 
conflicts with EU law which gives concrete expression to the fundamental right, is to 
be set aside. In fact, the national legislation is not in conflict with just EU law, the 
directive, hence it is in conflict with a fundamental right. When this right fulfils certain 
                                                            
31Idem, par. 31. 
32 Idem, par. 32, with reference to: Impact, C‑268/06, EU:C:2008:223, par. 100; Dominguez, C‑282/10, 
EU:C:2012:33, par. 25; and Association de médiation sociale (AMS), C‑176/12, EU:C:2014:2, par. 39. 
33 CJEU 19 April 2016, C-441/14 (Rasmussen), EU:C:2016:278, par. 33; with reference to: Centrosteel, 
C‑456/98, EU:C:2000:402, par. 17. 
34 Idem, paras. 35-37. 
35 Cf CJEU 19 April 2016, C-441/14 (Rasmussen), EU:C:2016:278, par. 41, with reference to CJEU 
judgements Defrenne, 43/75, EU:C:1976:56, par. 75, and Barber, C‑262/88, EU:C:1990:209, paras. 44 and 
45. 
36 CJEU 19 April 2016, C-441/14 (Rasmussen), EU:C:2016:278, par. 40. 
37 Idem, par. 40.  
38 Idem, par. 40; Defrenne, 43/75, EU:C:1976:56, paras. 69-75; Bosman, C‑415/93, EU:C:1995:463, par. 144. 
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criteria, the individual relying on this right should not be deprived of the protection of 
this right, also not because of general principles of legal certainty and the protection of 
legitimate expectations. Moreover, the CJEU argued that in fact there is no conflict with 
these principles, since with its interpretations it clarifies and defines the meaning and 
scope of EU law, i.e. the fundamental right, as it must be, or ought to have been, 
understood and applied from the time of its coming into force. Only in very exceptional 
circumstances the interpretation can be limited in its temporal effect, as was for instance 
the situation in the Defrenne-case and Bosman-case. 
The judgement in the Rasmussen-case has not tempered the comments on the 
effect of the Kücükdeveci-corrective, in particular not within the specific context of the 
general principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate expectations, and 
wider within the context of the competences of the CJEU in relation to that of the 
national supreme courts (when dealing with constitutional rights).39 Although very 
understandable, one thing seems to be overlooked within these comments, namely the 
fact that this effect is not lightly given to EU law. Understanding the requirements that 
need to be fulfilled in order for EU law to have this effect, is therefore highly relevant. 
 
3. The Requirements 
 
In this section the requirements will be introduced that EU law needs to fulfil 
in order to have exclusionary effect of national legislation. The requirements are 
deduced from various cases of the CJEU. This means that not all requirements are 
explicitly addressed in all the cases. This mostly is a consequence of the fact that in its 
rulings the CJEU is led by the specific circumstances of the case and the questions 
addressed to it by the referring national court. The cases used for this analysis are drawn 
from the field of labour law. This is not fortuitous: the EU Charter includes a substantive 
number of fundamental labour rights that have also been dealt with in directives.40 Every 
requirement is illustrated with positive and a negative examples of CJEU case law.  
 
3.1 Requirement 1: Does the situation fall within the scope of EU law? 
 
It seems an obvious condition that the situation must fall within the scope of 
EU law. This requirement is less straight forward as one might take it for. The situation 
at hand must concern not only a European fundamental right, but it also has to be 
worked out in some form of EU law, more particularly in a (provision of a) directive.41 
                                                            
39 Vas Nunes (2016) 'Tegen de wet', ARA; M. Rask Masden, H.Palmer Olsen, and U Sadl (2017), 
'Competing Supremacies and Clashing Institutional Rationalities: The Danish Supreme Court's Decision in 
the Ajos Case and the National Limits of Judicial Cooperation', iCourts Working Paper Series No. 85; and 
Forthcoming in European Law Journal (2017). 
40 This can to a large extend be explained by the political focus of EU social policy. E.g. the 1974 Action 
Plan of the European Commission, which holds many issues that were later included in the Community 
Charter for workers of 1989. Both formed the impetus for many EU directives in the field of social policy. 
Many of the rights of the Community Charter are included in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
41It is probably needless to say that the Kücükdeveci-corrective only is relevant in case of interpretation of 
national law in light of a directive. Provisions with direct effect (because they are unconditional and 
sufficiently clear enough), from the treaties, such as Article 157 TFEU on equal pay for m/w and from 
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This applies, for example, to the right to paid annual leave, which was the issue in the 
BECTU-case:42 it is recognized in Article 31 of the EU Charter and regulated in Article 
7 of Directive 2003/88. This also applies for age discrimination, which was central in 
the cases Mangold and Kücükdeveci;43 age is one of the discrimination grounds covered by 
Article 21 of the EU Charter and is (further) regulated in Article 6 of Directive 2000/78.  
However, since we are dealing with directives, there is a small catch, i.e. the 
transposition period. The main rule is that if the transposition period has not expired, 
national legislation doesn’t have to be in conformity with EU law yet. The purpose of 
this period is, after all, to implement the directive into the national legal order, and more 
specifically, to adopt and adjust national legislation in order to implement or comply 
with the requirements of the directive. This issue was addressed in the Mangold-case.44 
At the time the CJEU had to deal with the issue of age-discrimination in the Mangold-
case, the implementation period of framework Directive 2000/78 was not expired. 
Although the CJEU established this fact, it nonetheless reasoned as follows. First, the 
CJEU noted that the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age concerns a general 
principle of EU law found in the traditions and constitutions of EU Member States. 
Therefore, the observance of this right cannot depend on the expiration of the 
implementation period of the directive solely.45 Second, the CJEU repeated previous 
case law in which it ruled that “during the period prescribed for transposition of a 
directive, the Member States must refrain from taking any measures liable seriously to 
compromise the attainment of the result prescribed by that directive”.46 In such a 
situation, the CJEU further considered, it is “immaterial whether or not the rule of 
domestic law in question, adopted after the directive entered into force, is concerned 
with the transposition of the directive.”47 Although not stressed by the CJEU, such 
behaviour would be in conflict with the principle of loyalty laid down in Article 4(3) 
TEU. This principle includes a positive obligation for Member States to take any 
appropriate measure to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties 
or resulting from acts of the institutions of the EU. Moreover, it includes also a negative 
obligation for Member States, i.e. to refrain from any measure which could jeopardise 
the attainment of the Union’s objectives.48 The CJEU considered that the national 
legislation in the Mangold-case was in conflict with this negative obligation, meaning that 
                                                            
regulations (which are binding in its entirety and applicable directly in all Member States – Art. 288 TFEU), 
are applicable in the vertical as well as horizontal relations. Cf. Defrenne II C-43/75 EU:C:1976:56. 
42CJEU 26 June 2001, C-173/99 (BECTU) EU:C:2001:356.  
43CJEU 22 November 2005, C-144/04 (Mangold) EU:C:2005:709; CJEU 19 January 2010, C-555/07 
(Kücükdeveci/Swedex) EU:C:2010:21.  
44CJEU 22 November 2005, C-144/04 (Mangold) EU:C:2005:709.  
45 CJEU 22 November 2005, C-144/04 (Mangold) EU:C:2005:709, paras 74-76; and repeated in CJEU 19 
April 2016, C-441/14 (Rasmussen), EU:C:2016:278, paras. 22-23. 
46 CJEU 22 November 2005, C-144/04 (Mangold) EU:C:2005:709, par. 67, with reference to: CJEU 18 
December 1997, C-129/96 (Inter-Environnement Wallonie), EU:C:1997:628, par. 45. 
47CJEU 22 November 2005, C-144/04 (Mangold) EU:C:2005:709, par. 68, with reference to: CJEU 8 May 
2003, Case C-14/02 (ATRAL) EU:C:2003:265, paras. 58 and 59 
48 See more generally about the principle of loyalty in the EU: M. Klamert, Loyalty in the EU Treaties, 
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2014. 
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the State should have refrained from adopting the measure at stake, since it conflicts 
with the objectives of the adopted directive.49  
Thus, even before the transposition period has expired, Member States have to 
take the content of a directive into account, especially when adopting new legislation. 
This may raise the question whether the transposition period has no meaning when a 
fundamental right is concerned. The Römer-case sheds some light on the question.50 In 
this case the main claim was based on equal treatment on the grounds of sexual 
orientation, which is also one of the discrimination grounds listed in Article 21 of the 
EU Charter and is worked out in Framework Directive 2000/78. The subject for which 
equal treatment was sought concerned a supplemental retirement pension that is made 
dependent on the marital status between two partners. The CJEU considered that the 
subject of the claim is covered by the fundamental right and the Framework Directive. 
However, unlike the Mangold-case, the right of equal treatment could only be claimed 
after the transposition period of the directive had expired.51 This time the CJEU argued 
that Article 13 EC (now Article 19 TFEU) on which the directive is based, nor the 
Directive itself enables to bring a situation as at issue in the main procedures within the 
scope of EU law before the expiration of the transposition time.52 Furthermore, the 
CJEU reasoned that the national measure (which dated from 16 February 2001)53 was 
not a measure implementing Directive 2000/78 or any other provision of EU law.54 
However, the Court further considered, should the national measure “constitute 
discrimination within the meaning of Article 2 of Directive 2000/78, the right to equal 
treatment could be claimed by an individual such as the applicant in the main 
proceedings at the earliest after the expiry of the period for transposing the Directive, 
namely from 3 December 2003, and it would not be necessary to wait for that provision 
to be made consistent with European Union law by the national legislature.”55 
In contrast with the Mangold-case, the Römer-case thus illustrates that the CJEU 
is rather restrictive when it comes to bringing a situation within the scope of EU law, 
before the transposition period has expired. 
 
3.2 Requirements 2 and 3 Does the fundamental right grant a subjective right, and is 
this right unconditional and sufficiently clear enough? 
 
If the situation falls within the scope of EU law, then the next requirements 
seem to be that the fundamental right has to grant a subjective right and that this right 
has to be sufficiently clear and unconditional. The fundamental right must thus not be 
too abstract or programmatic in nature. This is, for example, the case with the rights to 
                                                            
49 CJEU 22 November 2005, C-144/04 (Mangold) EU:C:2005:709, para 67.  
50 CJEU 10 May 2011, C-147/08 (Römer) EU:C:2011:286. 
51 Idem, par. 57 - 62. 
52 Idem, par. 61, with reference to: ECL 23 September 2008, Case C‑427/06 (Bartsch) EU:C:2008:517, paras 
16 and 18; and CJEU 19 January 2010, C-555/07 (Kücükdeveci/Swedex) EU:C:2010:21, par. 25. 
53 Idem, para 9. 
54 Idem, par. 62. 
55Idem, par. 64. 
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non-discrimination on the grounds of age as expressed in Article 21 of the Charter.56 
Another example is the fundamental right to paid annual leave. In the BECTU-case, the 
CJEU determined that the right to paid annual leave as formulated in Article 31 of the 
Charter, grants a subjective right to individuals. In the Dominguez-case, the Court repeats 
that this right is expressly granted to all employees and that the claim on the right itself 
cannot be subjected to conditions.57 However, there are many modalities imaginable for 
the implementation of the right to paid annual leave and it is up to the Member States 
to set these modalities.58 In other words, the right to paid annual leave grants a subjective 
right to workers, however, is insufficiently clear to rely on without further (national) 
measures setting the modalities by which the right can be effectuated. 
In the AMS-case the CJEU concluded that Article 27 of the Charter on 
information and consultation of workers does not grant a subjective right.59 Central in 
this case ware national provisions dealing with the calculation of staff members in order 
to determine whether certain thresholds are met to establish workers representation.60 
These provisions correspond with Article 2, sub d of Framework Directive 2002/14,61 
which defines who counts as employee in order to determine whether the 
(establishment of the) undertaking falls within the scope of the directive. Although the 
directive pays explicit attention to the definition of employee, the provision refers to 
the definition of employee as “any person who, in the Member State concerned, is 
protected as an employee under national employment law and in accordance with 
national practice.” It is thus left up to the legislation of the Member States which 
persons within the undertaking qualify as employee. This renders the directive 
conditional, namely subjective to national legislation on the definition of employee. 
Moreover, the fundamental right itself in Article 27 of the Charter, includes reference 
to the “conditions provided for by Community law and national laws and practices.” 
This seems rather clear and straight forward. The right to information and 
consultation is made conditional in both, Article 27 of the Charter and in the 
Framework Directive on Information and Consultation. However, doubts could be 
raised whether the provision doesn’t constitute a subjective right. In its ruling on the 
AMS-case an acknowledgement of this doubt could be read in paragraph 44. Here the 
CJEU observes that “Article 27 of the Charter, entitled ‘Workers’ right to information 
and consultation within the undertaking’, provides that workers must, at various levels, 
be guaranteed information and consultation”.62 How this is to be guaranteed depends 
on the conditions provided for by Community law and national laws and practices. An 
                                                            
56CJEU 22 November 2005, C-144/04 (Mangold) EU:C:2005:709, par. 75; and CJEU 19 January 2010, C-
555/07 (Kücükdeveci/Swedex) EU:C:2010:21, par. 21. 
57CJEU 26 June 2001, C-173/99 (BECTU) EU:C:2001:356, par. 55; CJEU 24 January 2012, C-282/10 
(Dominguez) EU:C:2012:33, paras 16-19; and CJEU 20 January 2009, joined cases C-350/06 en C-520/06 
(Schultz-Hoff e.a.), EU:C:2009:18, par. 47. 
58 CJEU 24 January 2012, C-282/10 (Dominguez) EU:C:2012:33, par. 35.  
59CJEU 15 January 2014, C-176/12 (Association de Médiation Sociale (AMS)), EU:C:2014:2. 
60 Idem, para 11, 12 and 16. 
61 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a 
general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community. 
62 Something similar is claimed about Article 28 of the EU CFR. See: K. Ewing (2004), ‘Laws Against 
Strikes Revisited’, in Barnard, Deakin and Morris (eds.) The Future of Labour Law. Liber Amicorum Sir Bob 
Hepple QC, Oxford: Hart Publishers, p. 48.  
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analogy can be drawn with annual paid leave: the right is to be guaranteed, under which 
conditions or modalities depends on further legislation.63 In the AMS-case it is not the 
right itself that is at dispute, indeed, it are the conditions under which the 
(representatives of the) workers can enjoy the right to information and consultation. 
More particularly, the main issue is not whether representatives have a right, indeed the 
main issue concerns the determination of representation. The second preliminary 
question confirms this: 
 
“(2) In the affirmative, may those same provisions be interpreted as precluding a 
national legislative provision which excludes from the calculation of staff numbers in 
the undertaking, in particular to determine the thresholds for putting into place bodies 
representing staff, workers with [assisted] contracts?”64 
 
Before moving on to the last requirement I would like to put some emphasis 
on keeping these two requirements separated. Although the two requirements are 
closely related and making it difficult to separate them, keeping them separate may 
create room to give extra meaning to the fundamental rights in the Charter. Let me 
illustrate this with the following example. As already indicated above, the CJEU leaves 
room to interpret Article 27 of the Charter as a subjective right: the right of workers to 
be informed and consulted within the undertaking.65 What if this right would be claimed 
in combination with a right in a directive that is clear and unconditional? For example, 
Article 2, paragraph 1 of Directive 98/59 on collective redundancies.66 This article 
provides that ‘where an employer is contemplating collective redundancies, he shall 
begin consultations with the workers’ representatives in good time with a view to 
reaching an agreement’. This provision clearly grants a subjective right to consultation, 
which is also recognised as such by the CJEU in various cases.67 By separating these two 
steps it is possible to distinguish between two different situations. First, a situation in 
which a fundamental right is a subjective right which is made conditional upon further 
legislation, in both the Charter and the directive – as was the case in the AMS-case. 
Second, a situation in which a fundamental right is a subjective right which is made 
conditional upon further legislation in the Charter, but not in the directive. In the 
second situation the right as worked out in the directive is merely a confirmation of the 
fundamental right, since no further conditions are attached to it, like Article 2, paragraph 
1 of Directive 98/59. In the latter situation it could be imaginable that the Article 27 of 
the Charter has exclusionary effect on a conflicting national measure.  
                                                            
63 In this view the Civil Service Tribunal has applied this right in the following cases: Civil Service Tribunal 
30 June 2015 Case F-124/14 (Petsch v. Commission), ECLI:EU:F:2015:69, paragraph 44; and General Court 
11 November 2014, Case T-22/14 (Anna Bergallou v. European Parliament), ECLI:EU:T:2014:954, paragraph 
33. 
64 CJEU 15 January 2014, C-176/12 (Association de Médiation Sociale (AMS)), ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, paragraph 
22.  
65 Ibid, n64. 
66 Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to collective redundancies. 
67CJEU 27 January2005, C-188/03 (Junk) EU:C:2005:59;and CJEU 10 September 2009, C-44/08 (Fujitsu 
Siemens), EU:C:2009:533. 
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However, this is a hypothetic situation and admittedly a rather technical 
exercise which remains fictional for as long as the CJEU has not taken another stand as 
it did in the AMS-case. Furthermore, while commenting on the way how the CJEU put 
two requirements more or less together, I am doing the same in this hypothetical 
situation, since I actually give more meaning to the fourth requirement, reading it in 
combination with the second and the third. 
 
3.3 Requirement 4. How concretely is the fundamental right worked out in the directive? 
 
This is the point where directives get indirect horizontal effect. In fact, the 
directive in this construction is considered to be a further specification of the 
fundamental right.68 The test is about to what extent the (provision of the) directive is 
unconditional and sufficiently clear enough to be directly relied on.  
Examples where the CJEU found the (provision of the) directive conditional 
or insufficiently clear enough concern the right to paid annual leave (Article 31 of the 
Charter) and the right to information and consultation (Article 27 of the Charter). As 
discussed before, concerning the right to paid annual leave, the CJEU considered that 
the right itself is a subjective right which cannot be made conditional, however, it is 
subjected to various modalities of execution to be determined by the Member States, 
which renders the right insufficiently clear. Article 7 of the Working Time Directive69 
reads exactly the same as the right formulated under Article 31(2) of the Charter. As 
such, it (merely) confirms the fundamental right, including its openness with regard to 
the modalities of execution.70  
The findings of the CJEU in the AMS-case, concerning the right to information 
and consultation, were even more clear. Not only did the CJEU find Article 27 of the 
Charter insufficiently clear and conditional, Article 2, sub d of Directive 2002/14 is even 
more explicitly conditional since it stipulates that ““employee” means any person who, 
in the Member State concerned, is protected as an employee under national employment 
law and in accordance with national practice.” 
As already elaborated in section 3, it is on precisely this point that Article 27 of 
the Charter can possibly be evaluated differently when the conditionality is not in the 
directive. Which is for instance the case with Article 2, paragraph 1 of Directive 98/59 
on collective redundancies However, would the legal issue be a different one, for 
example, who accounts as representative of the workers, this directive too would render 
the fundamental right conditional. Article 1, par. 1, sub b of Directive 98/59 defines 
“worker representatives” as “the worker representatives provided for by the laws or 
practices of the Member States.” The end result would thus be the same as it was with 
the AMS-case. However, this can at best mean that a certain representative of the 
workers is excluded from the right, because this person is not recognized by national 
                                                            
68 Cf CJEU 19 January 2010, C-555/07 (Kücükdeveci / Swedex), ECLI:EU:C:2010:21, para 21. 
69. Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning 
certain aspects of the organisation of working time. 
70 Cf. CJEU 26 June 2001, C-173/99 (BECTU) ECLI:EU:C:2001:356, para 55; CJEU 24 January 2012, C-
282/10 (Dominguez) ECLI:EU:C:2012:33, para 19 
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standards. The right to information and consultation itself, as laid down in Article 2, 
paragraph 1 of Directive 98/59 remains unencumbered.  
Two things are thus important to keep in mind with this last requirement. First, 
it is about the concreteness of a specific provision of a directive, rather than the directive 
in general. Second, so far the CJEU has been very strict with its interpretations and 
evaluations of the fundamental rights. It could be argued that with this restrictive 
approach the CJEU proves to be well aware of the far reaching effect of allowing a 
(provision of a) directive dealing with a fundamental (social) right to exclude a national 
provision. Article 21 of the Charter is one of the few that has been granted this effect. 
In these cases Mangold and Kücükdeveci, the Court judged that the right to equal treatment 
on the grounds of age is anchored in the EU Charter and that Framework Directive 
2000/78 only concretises this. Article 6 of the Framework Directive leaves the Member 
States a broad margin of discretion in terms of justifying the age-discrimination with a 
legitimate aim and proving that the discriminatory rule is necessary and proportionate 
to achieve that legitimate aim. With respect to the content of the measure Member 
States thus have considerable room for action, however, the way how a discriminatory 
rule (or practice) can be justified is clear and unconditionally regulated by the directive. 
Therefore, Article 6 of the Framework Directive is sufficiently clear and unconditional, 
and since it concerns a recognised principle of EU law, codified in Article 21 of the 
Charter, it can have the effect of excluding the conflicting national provision.  
Other grounds addressed in Article 21 of the Charter have been speculated to 
also have exclusionary effect, i.e. disability and sexual orientation.71 A reserved 
approach, however, seems appropriate when it comes to the discrimination ground 
‘belief’, given that there can still be discussion about what a ‘belief’ is. For instance: Is 
veganism a belief?72 
Exclusionary effect has also been given to Article 47 of the Charter (right to an 
effective remedy and to a fair trial). This right was briefly dealt with in the Elektrobudowa 
Spółka Akcyjna (ESA)-case.73 In this case Polish workers who were posted to Finland, 
claimed certain working conditions of the Finnish collective labour agreement. They 
were entitled to these rights based on the Posting of Workers Directive74 and had ceded 
their claim to these rights to the Finnish trade union Sähköalojen ammattiliitto ry. The 
Polish employer, ESA, asked the Finnish Court to declare itself not competent to deal 
with the case, since Polish law prohibits that claims under labour law are transferred. 
The Polish trade union argued that if the Finnish Court would not deal with the case, 
the Polish workers would be deprived from their fundamental right to have access to a 
fair trial since no other court could deal with the case. With reference to Article 47 of 
the Charter and Article 6 of the Posting of Workers Directive, the CJEU declared that 
                                                            
71 SMM Peters, ‘Sociale Grondrechten’, in FJL Pennings and SMM Peters (eds), Europees Arbeidsrecht, 
Deventer: Wolters Kluwer (2016), p. 74. 
72 E.g. S Bruers, ‘The Core Argument for Veganism’, 43 Philosophia (2015), 271-290; and DD Page, 
‘Veganism and Sincerely Held “Religious” Beliefs in the Workplace: No Protection Without Definition’, 7 
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor and Employment Law (2005), 363. 
73 CJEU 12 February 2015, C-396/13 (Sahkoalojenammattiliittory/EiektrobudowaSpółkaAkcyjna), 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:86, point26. 
74 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning 
the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services.  
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the Finnish Court should be competent. Consequently, the Polish legislation prohibiting 
the transfer of the labour law claims was excluded from application. 
 
4. Closing remarks 
 
While the CJEU stressed in the Rasmussen-case that in principle national courts 
are obliged to interpret national legislation in conformity with EU law, there will be 
situations in which this will not be possible. If such a situation concerns a fundamental 
right, this may result in the exclusion of national legislation. This effect, the exclusion 
of national legislation, has been indicated with the “Kücükdeveci-corrective” or 
“Swedex-mechanism”. Many studies and commentaries on such cases have indicated 
that these cases are rather complex. This study took another approach and analysed the 
CJEU’s case-law from a more formal or procedural point of view. The result of this 
analysis is the identification of four requirements the CJEU seems to check in order to 
evaluate possible exclusionary effect of EU fundamental rights. These are: 
1) Does the situation fall within the scope of EU law? 
2) Does the fundamental right grant a subjective right? 
3) Is the fundamental right unconditional and sufficiently clear enough? 
4) How concretely is the fundamental right worked out in the directive? 
These requirements will not make these cases less complex, however, they do 
help to get a little grasp on how the CJEU operates in such cases. Furthermore, the 
analysis indicates that the CJEU interprets these requirements strictly. This means that 
the CJEU does not easily accept the fulfilment of each of the requirements, as well as 
that all requirements need to be fulfilled. Since the Charter includes rights and principles 
it is not easy to predict which of the rights and principles will have the potential of 
exclusionary effect. And even those rights the CJEU already dealt with may be 
inconclusive as I argued with the hypothetical example of Article 27 of the Charter. 
Although these formal requirements are of little assistance in the assessment of the 
merits of these cases, they are of help in understanding what needs to be assessed. 
 
